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For British feminist legal studies, as indeed for all socio-economic scholarship in the UK, 
these are discomfiting and confusing times. Lack of information on the sheer complexity of 
the legal and political form and consequences of the vote to leave the European Union has 
left the nation adrift on meaningless aphorisms, such as Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
‘Brexit means Brexit’ – whether Brexit actually means a true ‘go-it-alone’ for Britain remains 
mysterious.  The celebratory mood of the ‘winning’ side seems surreally detached from a 
less glorious reality, in which the true impact of prolonged economic  and administrative 
uncertainty is yet to reveal itself. Disillusionment with UK party politics and the dire 
stranglehold of the neoliberal consensus (Hall, Massey and Rustin 2015), deepened and 
hardened by austerity, appears to have driven some of the Leave vote (Harris 2016).  These 
voters have replied to neoliberalism’s brutal refrain that ‘there is no alternative’ by voting 
for one, in the teeth of the government, the opposition, most of the business community, 
and the ‘experts’ of whom, as Michael Gove so memorably stated, everyone is tired. The 
collapse of the Labour party into internecine strife leaves these voters with a very real 
democratic deficit, an effective one-party state in Britain, which looks to have swung 
somewhat to the right of the previous one. The supposedly lost ‘grand narrative’ of 
nationalism and imperialism is resurgent in the USA as well as the UK: thus, we see claims 
from Donald Trump and the UK right-wing media that both America and Britain are going to 
be made ‘great again’ – in defiance of the fact that nation-states ‘are steadily being replaced 
by a transnational plutocracy’ (Polsky 2015, 230). The half-baked proposals of the Leave 
campaign to make Britain a centre of global free trade melancholically recall British imperial 
and colonial rhetoric. Exhorted to ‘take back control’, the electorate have only fantasies of a 
lost Empire to reclaim. Fantasy-imperialism thus meshes with anti-globalisation sentiment – 
the macho national dominance that will supposedly quell global feminisation.   
The vote has brought stark inequalities and losses in post-1970s British society to the 
forefront of political debate, and a disrupted gender order appears to be one of these. The 
overwhelming Leave vote in the impoverished post-industrial Labour heartlands of the 
North of England and South Wales led journalist John Harris to claim in his pre-Brexit survey 
of the national working-class mood that male losses were at the heart of the crisis:  ‘men 
(and men are particularly relevant here) who would once have been certain in their identity 
as miners, or steelworkers, now feel demeaned and ignored’ (Harris 2016). Feminisation of 
the labour force through zero-hour, call-centre work reduces the proud working man to 
‘demeaning’, unmasculine, low-paid and insecure labour. Nonetheless, since Brexit is, 
according to the analysis of most economists, likely to lead to long-term economic 
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contraction for the UK, it is likely that women (who suffer disproportionately from cuts to 
services and benefits), particularly women in the poorest rural and Northern post-industrial 
areas, will be among the hardest-hit groups.  They suffer alongside men from the loss of 
secure, non-flexible work and steeply rising housing and living costs. There was in fact 
gender parity across the vote, with class, age and education being much stronger 
differentials. Voting analysis presents feminists with a dilemma that perhaps they have not 
had to confront so starkly before: the majority of poorer (and older) women primarily voted 
Leave (Statista 2016; Ashcroft 2016). These are women most British feminists would agree 
are deeply and unfairly disadvantaged, primary targets for political, legal and social reform. 
They have, however, mostly voted for what looks likely to be a future of decreased trade, 
fewer ‘foreigners’, the slashing of development funding for the areas in which many of them 
live, and the potential bonfire of the laws which have protected low-paid workers and 
women’s rights in the UK for decades. There are other, perhaps more painful 
acknowledgements which must be made. Leave voters are overwhelmingly white (73% of 
black British citizens voted Remain), and overwhelmingly demonstrate contempt for 
feminism (with 78% believing it to be a force for ill), social liberalism (74%) and 
multiculturalism (81%) – but are far more evenly split on capitalism (Ashcroft 2016). Many 
British feminists, particularly those who live in the South East, in cities, or work in 
universities, are now forced to realise that they – not the public schoolboys and ex-
financiers who led the Leave campaign – represent the hated ‘metropolitan elite’ (Williams 
2016; O’Neill 2016), deemed to be smugly out of touch with what Nigel Farage, in his 
European Parliament victory/departure speech, called the ‘ordinary, decent’ people of 
Britain. The sense of polarisation is tangible. We ‘metropolitan’ feminists have no doubt 
suffered from the lamentable social media ‘bubble’ effect (Crary 2014, 53); feminist 
publications, blogs and facebook groups, where a racist or sexist comment or attitude will 
attract immediate censure, reinforce our sense that ‘we’ speak for oppressed women; but 
many underprivileged women clearly see feminists and ‘leftists’ as patronising and harmful. 
Do we thus simply condemn those women as racist and sexist themselves? Or do we 
attempt in some way to try to address the gulfs which have clearly arisen between ‘our’ 
feminist praxis and much of the ‘grassroots’ we purport to represent? 
Feminist members of the disappointed 48% clearly need to deal with ‘our’ own sense of 
shock and loss and our clear epistemological distance from ‘ordinary’ people; and this point 
has validity even for those of us who did not recognise ourselves as an ‘elite’ until June 24. 
Yet when cities such as London, with levels of inequality higher than almost anywhere in the 
UK, and post-industrial cities such as Liverpool and Stockport have overwhelmingly voted 
Remain, must we simply be humbled and ‘suck it up’? The middle-class ‘elite’ are not what 
they are painted: all except the richest are experiencing lowering wages, rising debt, and the 
threat of becoming ‘waste’ humans as late- neoliberal ‘eschatology’ expands its punitive and 
disciplinary apparatus (Peck 2013; Bauman 2004). Responsibilisation discourse – the citizen 
as ‘rational autonomous economic agent’ and consummate individual (Walker et al. 2014) – 
justifies these extensions of discipline.  All labour, even the better-paid, better-qualified end 
of it, faces constriction as capital rises to unimagined heights of control (Berardi 2005). In 
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this context, attacking middle-class city-dwellers fails to take account of the depredations of 
precarity in the new flexible knowledge economies which many share with the young. The 
under-30s, who must endure less security, higher debt and fewer opportunities than their 
parents, now see their freedoms further curtailed and their ‘country taken back’ to an era 
they never lived through, amid imperial nostalgia which is meaningless to them. Women 
aged 18-24 were the group most strongly in favour of Remain, at 80% (Statista 2016). As Ros 
Gill (2008) notes, young women are the emblematic hardworking, well-trained, low-paid, 
flexible, neoliberal workers. The feminisation of middle-class workers affects both them and 
men in similar jobs, as employers demand more and more ‘passion’ and ‘commitment’ for 
less money, while burdening the acquisition of skills with mounting debt.  
 
Brexit and the ‘right-wing woman’ 
To consider the ‘conservatism’ of the primarily older women who voted Leave, I have 
returned to a radical feminist text, Andrea Dworkin’s Right Wing Women (1978). Dworkin 
argued that right-wing women believe (and vote) as they do out of fear of and displaced 
anger at male violence, but what she says about the morphing of displaced anger into hate 
and fear has broader application: 
The Right provides these symbols of danger by designating clearly defined groups of 
outsiders as sources of danger. The identities of the dangerous outsiders can change 
over time to meet changing social circumstances—for example, racism can be 
encouraged or contained; anti-Semitism can be provoked or kept dormant; 
homophobia can be aggravated or kept under the surface—but the existence of the 
dangerous outsider always functions for women simultaneously as deception, 
diversion, pain-killer, and threat. The tragedy is that women so committed to 
survival cannot recognize that they are committing suicide. (1978, 34-5). 
Brexit politics has brought the conservative, anti-feminist feminine into public focus to a 
degree not seen since Margaret Thatcher’s reign – not least since the boys’ brigade of 
Johnson, Gove and Farage was swiftly replaced by a female Prime Minister. Before the vote, 
writer AA Gill (2016) gave a scathing depiction of ‘Little England’ in female form:  ‘Middle-
aged, middle-class, middle-brow, over-made-up, with her National Health face and 
weatherproof English expression of hurt righteousness, she’s Britannia’s mother-in-law. The 
camera closed in on her and she shouted: “All I want is my country back. Give me my 
country back.”’. Yelling for the imaginary security of ‘sovereignty’  and the tightening of 
borders, this woman is not easily absorbed into left or feminist imaginings of the ‘left-
behind’ of neoliberalism. Far easier to sympathise with the single mother, living in a 
deprived area of Manchester, who complains of ‘the lack of a local park, or playground, and 
her sense that all the good stuff went to the regenerated wonderland of big city 
Manchester, 10 minutes down the road’ (Harris 2016). Dworkin teaches us that 
disadvantaged women, too, may worship the bully who offers ‘protection’; 34% of Trump 
voters in one recent poll are women (Johnson 2016). The election of Theresa May has, for 
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this writer at least, aroused distant memories of Margaret Thatcher and her use of imagery 
of domestic femininity to inculcate ‘macho’ neoliberal values (Hall and O’Shea 2013).  
Discourses of austerity, with their appeal to the fantasy olde Englande of thrift and 
moderation, have probably had some impact here, particularly on women old enough to 
remember lost decades which appear less materialistic, confusing and brutally individualistic 
than today. Women, in their cultural role as guardianesses of family identity and memory, 
are taught to nurture the domestic past; nostalgic ‘retro’ marketing is strongly directed at 
them (Negra and Tasker 2014). Post-crash austerity ‘chic’ meshed seamlessly in 2012 with a 
revival of nationalist symbolism during the London Olympics and the Queen’s Jubilee 
celebrations. Post-Brexit, it may take on a new vigour. Efficient housewifery gains 
importance in straitened times: and when (as Harris (2016) shows) all that the new 
economy can offer a woman worker is Universal Credit and cycles of zero-hour work 
alongside an equally exhausted partner, liberal notions of gender equality no doubt look like 
a dream for luckier others to nurture.  
 
Post-truth, information ‘overload’ and gender politics 
In light of the Brexit vote against a status quo presented as the only safe way by irritating 
‘experts’, and the rise of Trump amid ludicrous promises of anti-immigrant walls paid for by 
Mexico, we can perhaps reassess the Nietzschian/ Foucauldian concept of ‘knowledge as 
power’ in the so-called global ‘information age’ – also the ‘post-truth’ era (Keyes 2004).  As 
Harris documented (2016), the Leave majority was no shock to those who had talked to and 
listened to poorer and older British people, although it transpired that not many ‘experts’ 
had. This majority of elderly people, although better off than many young workers, have not 
had the chances or training to engage with the fast-moving global information-universe 
which the ‘cognitariat’ (low-paid knowledge workers) inhabit (Berardi 2005). Thus, like the 
working class and unemployed, they are the left-behind of the flexible, fast-moving 
knowledge economy. Knowledge has historically been hoarded and manipulated to keep 
certain populations ‘in their place’. If knowledge oppresses, frightens or threatens, then one 
way to feel more powerful is to subvert it through increased attachment to blind belief – 
anything that undermines the authority of the ‘experts’. It is this ‘post-truth’ approach that 
characterises much of the Brexit campaign, Trump’s rise in the US and, in an extreme form, 
Islamic State, which subverts the Qu’ran itself in order to further its immediate cause. 
Aggressive rejection of any information hostile to ‘our’ cause then provides a glow of 
subaltern righteousness, uniting those oppressed and disenfranchised by knowledge (Peter 
Cain, personal communication). Instinctive forms of ‘truth’ also flourish in the atmospheres 
fostered by social media whereby every opinion is as good as any other and impact is 
achieved via dominating attention with rapidly shifting and emotionally engaging imagery 
which limits the capacity for critical judgement (Sherwin 2000). Trump articulates the 
frustrations and confusion of a populace overloaded with clashing ‘facts’ and constantly 
exposed to quickfire emotional assaults, even as he bombards them with more of the same.  
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Post-truth campaigners do not necessarily have to have a clear programme to be successful: 
the feeling that the powerful are being viciously attacked is exhilarating in itself and will 
sustain the leadership for a long time. The fact that this may eventually lead to a mass of 
contradictory and competing policy claims is a secondary concern at the moment – and the 
moment is all that matters since, in a post-truth world, the future can be easily reinvented, 
as Orwell would have recognised. In the age of ‘information overload’, when knowledge 
increases at a dizzying pace, ‘know-nothingism’ among the left-behind will increase (Peter 
Cain, personal communication). The deployment of the language of victimisation by the new 
Right in both America and Britain (posing ‘feminazis’ and ‘left/libtards’ as intimidating 
bullies and enemies of ‘free speech’) fuels the widespread sentiment that political 
correctness is blocking the expression of home truths, particularly about immigration 
(Melossi 2000). Politicians such as Trump and Farage promise legitimation of grudges the 
liberal world rules unspeakably offensive; Farage’s characterisation of Leave voters as 
‘ordinary, decent people’ laid unspoken emphasis on their implicit condemnation by a 
snotty establishment. Harris (2016) expresses this as a sense that ‘no one is listening’ when 
communities change beyond recognition; although the comparatively low levels of 
immigration in most Leave areas perhaps tend to back the hypothesis that the devil you do 
not know is more terrifying than the one you do. There seems little point in denying that 
many poorer and older people (including many women) dislike large numbers of 
‘foreigners’, or the very idea of them, coming into ‘our country’ (Melossi 2000). Brexit has 
simply given such durable sentiments the political legitimation they had been denied for 
decades. Fears of the marauding foreigner, as Donald Trump (and, let us not balk at the 
comparison, Adolf Hitler) would attest, are powerfully immune to facts, and increase 
according to the relative distance of the offending object: for if I personally know and like a 
Polish person, it is that much harder for her to embody the disappointments and restrictions 
of my own life. ‘Bad’ immigrants are figured as mostly criminal males, although the 
excessive ‘breeding’ of female immigrants also causes concern. Dario Melossi (2000, 165) 
points out that most news stories relating to immigrants feature criminalised activity such as 
drugs, violence, or prostitution.  Get rid of him/her and the fear-source is at least 
temporarily externalised and quelled. Certainty, rigidity, and promises to punish and banish 
the ‘dangerous’ appeal to both men and women, often more than shifting promises of 
fairness amid prosperity which leave too many behind. 
It seems that ‘we’ – and in this ‘we’ I obviously include feminist academics – have perhaps 
misread (if not underestimated) the impact of globalisation and neoliberal eschatology on 
the left-behind. ‘We’ perhaps need to understand more clearly that the powerful symbol of 
the oppressed working-class woman may have misled us into incorrect characterisations of 
certain female populations, who do not see us as allies or representatives, but as irritatingly 
cosmopolitan, wet PC liberals who dismiss their very real concerns about the changes and 
dislocations that global neoliberalism and an angrily populist media have brought to their 
attention, if not necessarily their doorsteps. Perhaps we have overestimated the level at 
which our concerns for oppressed British women (real and crucial issues of poverty, 
domestic violence provision, racial equality, et al) actually mirror theirs. My other point is 
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perhaps more controversial; perhaps we should not focus so much on excusing harmful 
decisions on the part of ‘oppressed’ populations, and thus continue to configure them as 
vulnerable yet somehow saintly representatives of untouchably subaltern ‘truths’. In the 
‘post-truth’ world, we may do ourselves and feminism more justice by continuing to uphold 
versions of ‘truth’ which do not simply validate those of the angry majority. There is still 
room for standpoint theory, in that we must clearly learn to listen to and recognise the 
suffering, loss and anger of the female white working class. We must perhaps, however, 
stop asking only the questions we want to hear answers to. If working class women unfairly 
blame immigrants for their sufferings, to give just one example, feminism itself falls into its 
own post-truth by ignoring the angrier and more punitive aspects of this sentiment, or 
attributing it primarily to men. There is clearly a need for emphasis on the benefits of 
certain aspects of globalisation alongside anti-capitalist and anti-austerity campaigning: the 
new machismo of protectionist nationalism demands targeted feminist responses which 
directly address the alienation of white working-class women. In this brief intervention, I 
cannot set out what these might be. All I can say at this stage of the ‘Brexit era’ is that we 
urgently need to start dreaming them up. 
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